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     UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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     SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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     UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
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                                             19 Cr. 366 (LGS)
                V.
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     STEPHEN M. CALK,
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                    Defendant.
                                            Oral Argument on
                                             Motions in Limine
 7
                                              (Via Teleconference)
      -----x
 8
                                              January 26, 2021
9
                                              2:02 p.m.
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     Before:
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                         HON. LORNA G. SCHOFIELD,
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                                              District Judge
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                               APPEARANCES
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          Southern District of New York
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(Case called)

THE DEPUTY CLERK: The parties' appearances have been noted for the record.

Before we begin, I'd like to remind the parties and the press and anyone else observing this proceeding that recording or rebroadcasting of this proceeding is prohibited. Violation of this prohibition may result in sanctions.

I'm also going to ask counsel to please state your name before you speak each time you speak, as we have a court reporter present.

We're here before the Honorable Lorna G. Schofield.

THE COURT: Hello, everybody. Thank you for convening here remotely.

I just want to, as a preliminary matter, confirm with Mr. Calk that he agrees to our proceeding in this way and not in person.

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am, I do. Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay. And I'll just say for the record that the reason we are proceeding remotely is of course because we are still in the midst of a pandemic. The pandemic has required us to postpone the trial yet again. And there are matters, though, that we need to get in order so that we can be ready to try the case as soon as we're able to do that, and that includes the motions in limine concerning the parties' proposed expert witnesses, and that is the purpose of our

convening today.

So what I propose is, why don't we talk about the witnesses first, and then let's talk about a trial date, to the extent it's useful or possible to do that.

So as you know, I had asked for us to get together today so that we could discuss two of the government's proposed experts -- namely, Mr. Paulson and Ms. Aguirre -- and I don't intend to have any prolonged discussion of the other proposed witnesses, the two other government witnesses or the defense proposed witness. And I've reviewed your papers, and my plan is to rule on that soon, together with the two witnesses we're talking about today.

So just to get us on the same page, I think everybody agrees — it's one of the few things we all agree on — that the main factual issue in the case is whether or not the defendant, Mr. Calk, acted corruptly in connection with the Manafort loans, and so all of the expert testimony that's being proffered is intended to go to that issue. And one of the things that has been sort of in the air in our discussions up to now is the issue of the quality of the loans. I think we, again, all agree that whether the loans were good or bad is not dispositive of the issue of whether or not Mr. Calk acted corruptly. I'm not entirely sure, but I think we all agree that everybody believes that the quality of the loans can be probative of the issue of whether he acted corruptly. In other

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words, if they were terrible loans and Mr. Calk knew that and pushed them forward anyway, one might argue that that is at least circumstantial evidence of corrupt intent; on the other hand -- and I know this is somewhat contrary to the government's argument -- the opposite might be said, that if he thought that they were good loans and that they would benefit or be profitable to the bank and pushed them forward, that that would also be probative of Mr. Calk's state of mind.

But the reason I'm bringing all this up now is because the picture I'm getting from reading the parties' papers -and, you know, they reflect an evolution in thinking, I think, on both sides -- is of a dog chasing its tail, and the reason I say that is because everybody seems to be saying, well, we don't want to get into that issue unless the other side gets into it. And so the government is saying, you know, we're going to put forward our witnesses, but they're not going to talk about the quality of the loans unless the defendant opens the door to that issue. And the defendant says, well, we have this expert witness and he can talk about the quality of the loans, but we're not going to talk about that unless the government's witnesses are permitted to testify, I presume including on the quality of the loans. And to some extent, you know, I think it's maybe a strategic question of both sides saying who's going to go first with this issue, but unless we have some sort of common understanding of whether this issue is

in the case or not, you know, it's hard for me to rule, it's hard for you to plan, so what I'm hoping is that you'll both tell me a little bit about your current thinking, having read the other side's papers, about what your plan is on that issue, both in your case in chief and in response to the other side's case. And of course I'm mindful that the defendant doesn't have to put on a case, he doesn't have to do anything at a criminal trial, but why don't we have a discussion anyway.

So why don't I start with the government. Who's speaking for the government?

MR. MONTELEONI: Good afternoon, your Honor. Paul
Monteleoni for the government. With me on the line, as I think
has been noted, are my colleagues Hagan Scotten and Benet
Kearney.

Yes. I think that it's hard for us to envision a world in which the quality of the loans is just not an issue in the case in any way. I think that that seems very unlikely to happen, both because of some aspect of the way that the government is planning to put in its case, which I'll talk about in a moment, then also, you know, I think it's been raised by defense in a number of ways in which I would just be very surprised if they sort of didn't raise it themselves. But I think the way that we can really speak to is that, you know, there's a number of emails that reflect, and then there's going to be a bunch of testimony from the bank personnel who were

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working on the loan that will reflect, that a large number of bank personnel, basically, you know, the people working on the loan, believed that these were bad loans. There was, you know -- I think that a little bit of that discussion came before you in connection with the suppression motion. attached some emails that sort of more relate to portions that were, you know, shown to Mr. Calk, but beyond the emails that went to Mr. Calk, it would be almost impossible to present the story of the loans at the bank without presenting the fact that they were, and were perceived to be by the bank personnel, very risky, problematic loans and that most of the people working on the loans believed would not have been extended if it were any borrower other than Mr. Manafort but were going to be extended sort of no matter what the problems were with the loans because of Mr. Calk. I think that those sort of percipient witnesses and the documents that in their motion the defense says, well, the government should prove its case with those, those are going to describe that these loans were sort of known to the people working on them to have big problems with it. that the issue is whether, you know -- the sort of more detail on that besides the documents telling their story and the bank personnel who worked on the loans telling their story is going to depend a little bit on to what extent the defense is going to try to argue at trial, you know, as they have in the pretrial proceedings, actually, these were good loans or maybe

they may not have been good loans but Mr. Calk believed they were good loans. You know, in that case I think that our view is that we would need to, you know, provide the sort of authoritative rebuttal that they were in fact not. But if the defense didn't really join that issue, then I could imagine keeping it just to the witnesses who worked on the loans and their documents. But those will tell a story which will — is not necessarily a story of the ultimate, like, credit rating of the loans, authoritatively determined by the OCC, but is definitely a story of the loans being perceived by everyone in the bank as extremely risky and problematic and, you know, and Mr. Calk being presented with a number of red flags of that.

THE COURT: Okay. Could I hear from the defense.

MR. LaVERNE: Yes, your Honor. And this is Darren LaVerne. I'll be speaking for Mr. Calk on this issue.

I think your Honor framed the issue correctly. I would amend it slightly to say I think the issue of the quality of the loans, or more particularly what Mr. Calk believed about the quality of the loans, goes not just to whether or not he acted corruptly but whether or not he intended to be influenced by what the government characterizes as Manafort's offer of assistance. And I think the defense's position is that will certainly be a critical issue at trial. I think we are well within our rights and intend to put on a defense that Mr. Calk had a very good reason for acting as a member of the loan

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committee, along with the other two members, in approving these loans; that is, that he believed them to be sound loans that were in fact beneficial for the bank. I expect Mr. Monteleoni characterized some of the evidence, the factual evidence, contemporaneous factual evidence, in a certain way. We will dispute that hotly, I expect, at trial, and the jury will make its decision.

I think where we part ways with the government is the role and the necessity for experts in this case. And in case it wasn't clear from our papers, while we have noticed an expert as a rebuttal witness, we are perfectly content to try this case without experts based simply on the contemporaneous factual record, which includes thousands of emails from which the jury can draw inferences about Mr. Calk's intent, many of which the government has marked as exhibits in this case; a number of bank witnesses, who the government has now included in their witness list, which includes the lead underwriter at the bank, who worked on these loans, the bank's president Mr. Ubarri, who was another member of the loan committee, who approved these loans along with Mr. Calk, in addition to numerous other loan personnel and bank directors. And injecting experts into this case, it's the defense's position, is going to complicate matters, confuse the jury, particularly where the experts are testifying about matters that clearly were not known to Mr. Calk at the time, the relevant time,

which is the fall of 2016 and January of 2017. And, you know, just to bring us I guess back to the two witnesses, the two OCC witnesses that the government has noticed here, Ms. Aguirre, as your Honor knows from reading the papers, was not involved at all with the bank during the time that the loans were approved and issued. She came into play many months afterwards, in June and July of 2017, when she did an analysis of the Manafort loans. Now her analysis —

THE COURT: Well, I'm going to interrupt you there, because she is explicitly identified as a rebuttal witness, and what I heard you say is something similar to what I heard the government say, which is, we may not need to have these experts, meaning the two experts we're here to talk about today, and nothing either from Mr. Belanger about the quality of the loans. Sounds like we need Mr. McCutcheon regardless because that's a different issue, which is the thing of value issue. But if everyone is agreed, without any ruling from the Court, that we don't need to have expert testimony about the quality of the loans or the credit rating of the loans, and everyone is content to rely on the contemporaneous factual evidence, then this is a very short conference. But let me hear from Mr. Monteleoni.

MR. MONTELEONI: Yes, your Honor. I wouldn't exactly put it that way.

So, you know, first of all, our belief is that we

certainly recognize that they have opinions and noticed them
and that's why we're having these motions. We don't really
think that the two witnesses at issue here, Mr. Paulson and
Ms. Aguirre, are really experts. We wanted to sort of provide
this in an abundance of caution. The defense hasn't argued in
their papers that there's anything about this that requires
expertise or any issue with their qualifications. They just
sort of said this is sort of extraneous or too much. But I
want to get even a little more granular than that, which is, so
Mr. Paulson is very much a fact witness in that one of the
things he's going to be testifying about is a conversation that
he had with Mr. Calk, where Mr. Calk made a false statement.
But he's also going to be, you know what I think we would
like to put on that is in the nature of opinion, but we don't
think really expert, which is evidence of the framework and the
duties that are applicable to bank personnel in Mr. Calk's
position, which, you know, whether or not he went into great
detail or had an expert analysis of the loans is critically
important to allowing the jury to ascertain whether Calk was
acting with corrupt intent. So

THE COURT: So let's stop there for a second, because I'd like to ask a question about that.

So you talked about evidence of the framework, which I take to mean from your papers the regulatory framework, and the duties applicable, which I take it is all about Mr. Belanger's

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testimony, but let's talk about each of those separately, if that's possible.

How is Paulson's testimony about the regulatory framework relevant, important, and not something that's covered by Belanger?

Those are good questions, and we may MR. MONTELEONI: not have been as clear in our papers as we could have been. I think that the fact that banks operate under a conservative -- not maximally conservative, but a conservative regulatory framework, the risk rating system, and the fact that, you know, collateral alone does not justify the extension of loans is something that, you know, came up even in our pretrial suppression motion. It is very natural for the jury to sort of think, well, if there was collateral, then maybe he could just charge a high interest rate and kind of, who cares, it would be consistent with his duties as a bank president to take this gamble. And, you know, I think that explaining the sort of overall framework, not with respect to this loan but that that is not the rules he's operating under, that's not the rules that Mr. Calk would have been trained on and expected to know, and his deviation from that is evidence of corrupt That's one part of it. That has some level of overlap with Mr. Belanger on the concept of duties --

THE COURT: Let me ask you a question about that before we get to Mr. Belanger. Doesn't that lead us right back

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to the quality of the loans? I mean, doesn't that just lead to ultimately saying, you know, you have to look at all these other factors and then at some point somebody argues or somebody else introduces evidence and says, these loans were unsatisfactory because although they were hypothetically well collateralized and there was a high interest rate, they still weren't sound loans? I mean, doesn't that just take us right back to that issue that I thought was not supposed to be the centerpiece of this?

MR. MONTELEONI: Well, we certainly agree that it shouldn't be the centerpiece, but I think from the government's perspective, and it sounds like from the defense's perspective, there is going to be evidence that bears on the quality of the loans. The question is just what type of evidence, whether it's going to be an expert analysis and opinion about the quality of the loans or just sort of factual evidence that bears on that quality. But what Mr. Paulson would provide that's important is the context that's necessary for the jury to assess that factual evidence. The factual evidence is going to be coming in -- the emails about the steps that they take, the concerns that people had, people's testimony about the risks that they saw in the loan. Those are going to be issues that people will be arguing and I think we'll be placing some emphasis on for Mr. Calk's intent, and that comes in in a very different light when the jury understands that this is supposed

to be a conservative institution operating in a safe and sound manner as opposed to, you know, other types of institutions they might see, might be thinking about, like more speculative type of institutions that aren't OCC regulated. The same factual evidence, which is coming in either way, is going to be seen in a different light, based on, you know, whether the jury understands the context. And so we think this is very important.

THE COURT: Okay. That's helpful. Thank you. So I understand that.

I interrupted you. You were about to get to Belanger, so go ahead.

MR. MONTELEONI: Right. Well, I guess what I would say is that, you know, Belanger can speak to a piece of that from the perspective of a practitioner and the sort of duties as a practitioner would see them. You know, Mr. Paulson can speak just to one overlapping piece of that about the duties with respect to the risk rating of loans. You know, I think that we wouldn't present duplicative evidence on this issue of the duties from a risk perspective, but there are reasons — I mean, Mr. Paulson is actually extremely senior. He's currently the acting comptroller of the Currency. So he might be an appropriately authoritative person to sort of set the stage for that. Or maybe we would break off that piece and have

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address the issue of duties from a risk perspective twice. there's a different part of the duties that Mr. Paulson is best positioned to talk to, which relates to the insider abuse regulations. As to that, you know, we explain a lot in our papers that, you know, the evidence of breach of duty involves discussion of what those duties are, and, you know, without going into great detail, the basic fact that the exchange of loans for things of value -- and the jury's going to get instructed as to how that applies as to how those elements apply in the charge -- but the fact that this is a regulatory priority for the OCC that they attempt to communicate to bankers and that they put a lot of emphasis on that in their investigations -- or in their examinations, rather, all goes to the factual question of, you know, how likely is it that Mr. Calk was aware of all of this, which, of course, is extremely relevant to his intent just like, you know, in a case where someone was making a false statement on a form, whether the form had a warning that, you know, false statements can be prosecuted is relevant to the intent, just as to how much notice did he have, how much was his environment preparing him and training him to not do exactly what he did here. something that is --

THE COURT: So let me ask a question, just so I'm sure that I understand. So the reason we're getting into duties, regardless of whether it's Mr. Paulson talking about duties or

Belanger talking about duties, is that your argument is that there were certain duties that Mr. Calk knew or must have known about the duties, and the fact that he disregarded those and breached those duties suggests that he was acting with bad intent. Is that the argument, basically?

MR. MONTELEONI: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. And let me just say, before I hear from the defense, I mean, one of the things, frankly, that bothered me about these two witnesses from the OCC is that, you know, just like the prosecutors, to some extent they're wrapped in the flag, and I don't want the jury to have the impression that the government's case has the imprimatur of people at the highest levels in the regulatory agency that are overseeing the bank, because of course the regulatory issues are separate from whether someone is criminally liable for his actions. And so the 403 issues seem to me very real, given who the witnesses are. I think that's cured, to some extent, by your saying that Mr. Paulson, for example, will just talk about the regulatory framework and not apply any of that to the facts of this case, but it's still a concern of mine.

So let me hear from the defense.

MR. LaVERNE: Thank you, your Honor. This is Darren LaVerne again.

I think that is an excellent point and really highlights the issue, particularly with respect to Mr. Paulson,

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who Mr. Monteleoni noted was -- I think he's now the number two official at the OCC, so obviously the impact of his words are significant. On Mr. Paulson, I think it's useful to sort of separate out two pieces of what I understand to be his proposed testimony, which, respectfully to Mr. Monteleoni, I think got sort of mushed together in his recitation. There's the question of duty, which I think they've also proposed Mr. Belanger to testify to, but then there's a whole other sort of section of his testimony, and I'm just reading here from the government's disclosure letter. They propose that he be able to testify that, for example: The OCC system of regulation benefits the entire financial system and, accordingly, the entire economy. The roles of the OCC in effectively supervising institutions collectively provide confidence in the banking system. That's one example. Another is: abuse creates undue risk and could undermine the public's confidence in the institution and the banking system. Your Honor, you know, we would submit, you know, particularly in light of the concern you just highlighted, that testimony really has no place in this case. It's completely irrelevant and, respectfully, you know, just seems designed to inflame the jury and try to convince them that, you know, reaching a guilty verdict here somehow has importance to the larger economy. So we certainly would object to that.

On the questions about the risk rating system and the

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OCC's regulatory structure, that's all irrelevant if

Ms. Aguirre's testimony on risk rating in 2017 -- which, again,
is after the fact and has no bearing on Mr. Calk's intent -- is

not coming into evidence. So I see no relevance there, and
again, I see a very high risk of prejudice, unfair prejudice,
so we object on those grounds.

Just to circle back to the question of duty, which the government again has sort of raised in the context of trying to establish corrupt intent here, again, I would just note that, you know, the contemporaneous record -- if the government wants to put on evidence, for example, that Mr. Calk was aware of particular facts at the time, for example, I note that the government marked in their exhibits the bank's conflict of interest policy. Now we will have a debate, I'm sure, at trial about whether or not Mr. Calk, you know, violated that policy, but if part of their theory of the case is that he knowingly did something that was against the bank's own procedures or regulations, they can try to draw in the contemporaneous record to do that. They don't need a paid expert to come in and explain that concept to the jury -- it's not a particularly difficult concept -- or read the regulation to the jury. And, you know, particularly with regard to Mr. Paulson, again, it gives the imprimatur of something much more significant than it actually is. So I really do feel like, you know, that testimony is extraneous, irrelevant, and just risks a great

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deal of prejudice to Mr. Calk in this case.

THE COURT: Okay.

THE COURT:

MR. MONTELEONI: Your Honor, may I be heard?

THE COURT: Yes. Mr. Monteleoni.

MR. MONTELEONI: Yes. I apologize. It's

Mr. Monteleoni.

So with respect to this issue of, well, talking about the significance of the regulations, is that, you know, inflammatory or prejudicial, you know, I think that this might be something that -- this was never something that we were intending to really pound the table on or, you know, hit very heavily. And if that is the issue, I would think that we could work out ways of sort of presenting the evidence so that it wasn't unduly emphatic or prejudicial, but I would say that the fact that these are regulations to which the OCC attaches importance and that the regulatory scheme attaches importance to has some significance because, you know, if you imagine that the regulations that Mr. Calk violated were, like, that he tore a tag off a mattress when, you know, you're not supposed to tear a tag off a mattress, or some real obscure or technical thing that no one really cares about or no one is expected to know about, that stands in a very different posture to him violating duties that, you know, the bank regulator gives a lot of attention to, and I think that the latter fact would be --

Why is that fact relevant?

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MR. MONTELEONI: Well, because the fact that he's willing to breach important duties that he definitely knows about as opposed to sort of technical and obscure duties that maybe he's less likely to know about or maybe he's less likely to think anyone cares about, you know, really matters. If there was some evidence that, oh, yeah, that's on the books but no one cares about that, that never comes up, people don't pay attention to it, I would imagine that the defense would want to put that evidence in. And I think that what we envisioned was just a little bit, you know, on the opposite direction of that, like, no, these are important rules, they're looked into, they're things that are, you know, sort of examined at the periodic exams and that bank officials understand they're going to be. So not to pound the table or wrap anything in the flag, but just to sort of explain this isn't some dusty arcana that maybe doesn't really matter but this is stuff that would be important, so the jury can draw inferences as to what his motive really was when he violated them.

THE COURT: And then let me get clear on something else related to Mr. Paulson, and that is, assuming that the defense either makes argument in their opening or through cross-examination raises the issue about the quality of the loans or about the duties that Mr. Paulson would talk about, would it be then your intent to call Mr. Paulson back in rebuttal to say, oh, and Mr. Calk violated these duties in the

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So first of all, I think there's a MR. MONTELEONI: real prospect that if the defense is emphasizing any of this, that they're likely to do it in their opening statement, but maybe they won't. I think that Mr. Paulson we were never thinking of as addressing these particular facts of the case. He didn't himself examine the loan in the way that Ms. Aquirre did. You know, he had a particular fact interaction with the defendant, which he has to talk about, but beyond that, his testimony is going to be about the principles, and whatever doors the defendant opens, his testimony is going to stay about the principles. The people who will be sort of offering an opinion about the loans themselves, either from a regulatory perspective or from a practitioner perspective, would be Belanger and/or Aguirre, and again, if that door is opened, we wouldn't do it in a duplicative way, but, you know, there are things that each of them bring to the table that the other doesn't, so it might sort of depend in which way the door is opened. But we wouldn't anticipate bringing Mr. Paulson back for specifics about the loans. The only specifics would be about his fact conversation with Mr. Calk, which we would be bringing out in the beginning anyway.

THE COURT: Okay. So that's --

MR. LaVERNE: Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes. Mr. LaVerne?

MR. LaVERNE: I'm sorry. It's Darren LaVerne.

I just want to make sure it's clear, the defense does not plan to argue in any way, shape, or form that somehow the regulations at issue here or the laws are unimportant and seek some sort of verdict on that basis. I just think it's totally improper for either side to be putting on that kind of evidence, and while Mr. Monteleoni was sort of trying to downplay it and saying they're not going to pound the table, it just has no place in the case, particularly when we're talking about the number two official in the OCC coming in to testify in court.

THE COURT: Okay. So let's talk about Ms. Aguirre. And so it sounds like her testimony really is just geared at the loan and the downgrading of the loan, and even though she was there after the fact, my understanding is that she downgraded it essentially as of the time that it was issued, and again, my impression is that she was just a rebuttal witness, but now I'm not so sure, and I'm even more concerned in some ways about her and her coming in and saying, I speak for the OCC and these were bad loans, and, you know, anybody would have known that.

So let me hear from Mr. Monteleoni about Ms. Aguirre.

MR. MONTELEONI: Well, your Honor, I obviously certainly apologize for any confusion. There is potential -- we don't view her as really an expert but just someone who sort

of observed and reviewed these loans shortly after and then also observed a sort of telling reaction from the bank personnel who she communicated these problems to shortly after, so a little bit of further fact testimony that she may be offering about the aftermath of them. You know --

THE COURT: Say that again. I'm sorry. I didn't quite understand that. Say that again, or explain what you mean.

MR. MONTELEONI: I apologize.

THE COURT: Reaction from bank personnel?

MR. MONTELEONI: Yes. So she communicated her findings to the bank personnel at a meeting, and they reacted in an atypical way, which I think, you know, the jury will be able to draw their inferences for, but I think that we think that sort of their reaction to her explaining that she thought that the loan — that she saw these problems with the loan was sort of evidence that they believed that the loan was problematic and that they were uncomfortable with it, so it's sort of circumstantial evidence.

THE COURT: And what do you mean they reacted in an atypical way? Are you talking about statements that potentially are hearsay or something different?

MR. MONTELEONI: Well, sorry. So their lack of response, that is. She had a type of meeting where, you know, she has a lot of these meetings, and typically when she sort of

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sets up the meeting, she says, we're going to discuss this loan, and that happens for loans the OCC has sort of found issues with, and so the bank personnel that she meets with, typically, they're sort of prepared to respond or to argue about what the problem is with the loan and, you know, so they all come in sort of loaded for bear, and what happened this time is when she sort of set up the meeting and showed up that time, there was just a silent reaction, where no one sort of said any words to her, and that was, you know, an unusual thing that we think is going to suggest the defendant's intent. we don't think it's really hearsay. But also, I would note that even if there were a statement to be made, that these were all employees of the defendant within the scope of their employment. That's probably an issue that we might raise with respect to a number of documents, but, you know, we think that even if they had made statements, those would be admissible just as sort of fact testimony of what the bank personnel, you know, believed. But I didn't mean to get too sidetracked about what she would principally say, which is that I believe that she would be explaining that the documentation that she reviewed that were dated from the time that the loans were originated led her to the conclusion that the loans were of substandard quality at origination because of Manafort's insufficient cash flow and that it is very unusual, you know, in her experience to have to reclassify a loan to substandard

at the time of origination.

And again, the red flags that we would first be explaining that Mr. Calk was aware of all go to indications that he has cash flow problems and that this is sort of the fruition of a risk that he was aware of, just like in the Seabrook case, the Second Circuit found that the fruition after a bribe of a risk to a risky investment bore on the defendant's intent and the defendant was aware of risk. So similarly here, Mr. Calk is aware of risk. The evidence of their fruition would, you know, be relevant for the same reasons that it was in that case, which we cite in our memo of law.

With respect to the prejudice --

THE COURT: Wait, wait. Let me ask this question too.

I mean, I asked it about Mr. Paulson. I understand that

Mr. Belanger is at least prepared to testify about the

soundness of the loan, and it sounds as though it is the same,

but potentially less prejudicial. I know you were going to get

to the issue of prejudice. So why not just rely on

Mr. Belanger so we don't have that issue?

MR. MONTELEONI: If your Honor feels that we should be responding to it only with Mr. Belanger, if at all, then we would abide by the Court's ruling on that. The fact that she did this in the ordinary course of her job responsibilities, not as a paid expert for us and, you know, and we think not really as an expert, just as a trained sort of layperson, I

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think makes her testimony comprehensible and makes it credible. We don't think that -- I mean, we think that that's sort of the good kind of prejudice in that she doesn't have an arguable motive to shade things. I mean, I think that we could potentially address issues that, you know, just her being a government official, you know, gives too much of an imprimatur with an appropriate limiting instruction. We certainly expect that the jury would be informed that any of these regulatory issues or regulatory violations are not themselves bases for criminal liability, just as this type of evidence is admitted in the Gross case or in the McElroy case with these instructions; you know, we think that that satisfies prejudice. Of course if your Honor feels that that just can't be done, you know, we can offer the testimony of Mr. Belanger. But the fact that she sort of did this just in the course of her job, not because we were hiring her, and also because she had this factual interaction with them in the course of her review shortly after, we think that she does have something to offer, and I guess we would request that, you know, if you're inclined to rule in that direction, you sort of preserve the possibility of revisiting this if there's an aspect of relevance that we, you know, really feel like the defense raises and we can best address through her.

THE COURT: Okay. Could I hear from the defense.

MR. LaVERNE: Yes. Thank you, your Honor. And this

is Darren LaVerne again.

Again, I think there were a few things kind of conflated together there. And the details are actually sort of important to understand in assessing Ms. Aguirre's testimony.

First of all, on the issue of the meeting

Mr. Monteleoni was describing and some supposed nonreaction,

frankly, I have not heard anything about that before from the

government. It was not something covered in their extensive —

otherwise extensive write—up of what Ms. Aguirre's expected

testimony was, so I'm not quite sure what to do with that other

than to say that it sounds, at least right now, like some form

of hearsay, and I expect we'll have a separate debate on that.

With respect to the sort of core part of what I understand to be Ms. Aguirre's proposed testimony, which is the rating downgrade and her opinion in June and July of 2017 that these were substandard loans, the key point, your Honor, is really to understand the basis for that finding. And the basis for Ms. Aguirre's finding, as she stated in her report, was that the bank underwriting department was not properly accounting for noncash items and making accurate adjustments based on information in tax returns. There is no evidence that I'm aware of that the government has put forth that Mr. Calk was aware that the underwriting department was making this sort of mistake and error in its underwriting analysis, with respect to Mr. Manafort or anyone else. So her finding in that regard

really has no bearing, zero bearing, on what Mr. Calk's intent was in this case, and that's the key issue, again.

Separately, it's clear from Ms. Aguirre's report that she made that finding — that is, that the underwriting department was essentially doing an inaccurate analysis of tax returns — she made that finding with respect to four other loans in addition to the Manafort loan, that had nothing to do with Mr. Manafort. Apparently what she found was that the underwriting department, as a sort of, you know, loanwide problem, was inaccurately accounting for information in tax returns. So it really, again, is very attenuated when you look at the details as to the key question, which I think we have to remain focused on, which is whether or not Mr. Calk intended to be influenced corruptly here.

So this is set out in further detail in our papers, but I really think it's important to focus on that issue when we're talking about Ms. Aguirre.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MONTELEONI: May I be heard just briefly on the last point?

THE COURT: Yes. Mr. Monteleoni.

MR. MONTELEONI: I apologize for the serial nature.

Just the last issue that Ms. Aguirre's findings, you know, that there were somewhat related findings for other loans. I think that there will be plenty of evidence that Mr. Calk's level of

personal involvement in these loans in particular was unique and unusual and changes the significance of the underwriting because this is something that he should have been aware of.

But, you know, I guess we would just ask, if the issue is that, you know, Ms. Aguirre, the Court finds, is not the proper vehicle to put forward any of this, if the door is opened, that, you know, at least commensurate limits on the ways in which they could be, you know, impeaching Mr. Belanger if we have to put in Mr. Belanger, because we don't need

Ms. Aguirre — if we don't need Ms. Aguirre because, you know, we have Mr. Belanger, then we would ask that he not be able to be impeached in the ways that Ms. Aguirre couldn't. But I mean, we could deal with that down the line.

THE COURT: But let me do this, just so that we have something to show for all of this discussion. With respect to Ms. Aguirre, I think it is more clear. I would preclude her testimony about the downgrading of the loans as potentially confusing to the jury, because my fear is that they would think that the OCC's finding that the loans were of poor quality at the outset, even though it was later and for whatever reason it was, that they would somehow be confused into believing that because of that downgrading and the official nature of the downgrading, that it somehow carries more weight and therefore that she was, again, blessing the government's case and at the very least blessing their argument about what Mr. Calk should

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have known and what the quality of the loan was as opposed to looking at the merits of those arguments. And so I'm going to preclude her testimony. Of course you can bring out those issues about the quality of the loan -- not the downgrading but just the quality of the loans -- through Mr. Belanger, and I'd ask you to talk to each other to work out the appropriate scope of cross and impeachment so that the government isn't prejudiced by my ruling in the way that I have as to Ms. Aquirre.

And then with respect to Mr. Paulson, I will allow the testimony of Mr. Paulson, understanding that it is providing background information about the regulatory framework and that it is not addressed to the particular facts at all, and I would like the parties to confer about an appropriate limiting instruction for Mr. Paulson's testimony so that the jury isn't unduly influenced and understands that it's just background. And --

MR. LaVERNE: Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. LaVERNE: I'm sorry. It's Darren LaVerne. I just wanted to clarify --

THE COURT: Yes, Mr. LaVerne.

MR. LaVERNE: I just wanted to clarify on Mr. Paulson. Was your Honor precluding testimony about his opinion of the importance of regulations and the issues at stake here in this

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case? Leaving aside the regulatory context.

THE COURT: Thank you for reminding me. I hadn't addressed that one way or the other, but it seems to me that suggesting that this regulatory scheme and therefore the case are somehow critical to the health and well-being of the economy is a bit much. My impression also is that the government doesn't intend to do that. So if you could confer on that as well and try to come up with something more concrete, I think everybody understands your concern, and I agree that that shouldn't be a part of the case. On the other hand, I understand the government's argument that the regulations in question are not trivial and therefore Mr. Calk should have or likely would have known about them. I think that's something that is appropriate. So if you could try to work that out. And to the extent you can't work it out, if you would come back to me with a letter that includes, in a single letter, sort of your competing proposals, both what you agree on and what you don't agree on, and then I can resolve whatever the difference is.

MR. LaVERNE: Thank you, your Honor.

MR. MONTELEONI: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: With respect to Mr. Belanger, as I understand it, he's now talking about the duties owed by a bank director and CEO in the defendant's position, both with regard to regulatory standards and industry practice. My

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understanding further is that it won't be cumulative of anything Mr. Paulson says. The trial's going to be long enough. Please don't put in any cumulative testimony, particularly by way of background. And so I will allow that. I would like a joint instruction about his testimony, in substance, that the defendant is not charged with and can't be convicted for violating regulatory or legal or industry standards and that the evidence should be considered, if at all, only to the extent the jury determines that it bears on the defendant's state of mind. That's not even a suggestion. The two of you should come up with something together and then propose it to me.

And also, with respect to those duties, as I understand it, Mr. Belanger is not supposed to be talking about the breach of those duties, only that those duties are there, so the government may present evidence identifying those duties but should not talk about the consequences of breaching them, so shouldn't suggest that there was a breach of fiduciary duty for which there could be civil liability, or of regulatory duties, the violation of which would result in some penalty. He should just simply talk about the duties and not the consequences.

And then with respect to the fourth witness, Mr. McCutcheon, I would allow his testimony. It appears to be based on his experience, and he appears qualified to give it.

And so I will allow that. To the extent there are objections to the qualifications of any witness — whether Mr. Carron on the defense side or Mr. McCutcheon on the government's side — I think it goes to weight and not admissibility, so I will allow those witnesses. And I will allow Mr. Carron's testimony also. I think the objections go to the weight and not admissibility.

As to the other issues, which I think of as the sort of miscellaneous issues raised by the government, evidence or argument about the defendant's good acts, or evidence intended to elicit sympathy, my understanding from the defense is that they don't intend to offer any such evidence except to the extent that it's directly relevant to matters in the case. So for example, his experience in the armed forces as it relates to the prospect of acting as Secretary of the Army, that would be admissible.

And the argument about the charges being politically motivated, the defense has said that it doesn't intend to make any such argument, and therefore that objection or application on the part of the government is moot.

So I think that takes care of the motions in limine.

And what we should talk about then is the trial date. And of course, you know, that requires to some extent a crystal ball, which I don't have. So --

MR. MONTELEONI: Your Honor, might I raise one --

THE COURT: Yes. Who is this?

MR. MONTELEONI: Paul Monteleoni.

THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Monteleoni.

MR. MONTELEONI: One aspect of our motion with respect to Mr. Carron was that if his testimony was to be admitted, as we understand your Honor has ruled that it is, that a supplemental disclosure be ordered, at least with respect to his projections of profit and loss under reasonable assumptions. We honestly have no idea what those projections are or whether we agree with them because we don't know what the assumptions are and what the projections are.

wanted to give the defense an opportunity to revise their disclosure, which is something separate from what you're asking for at the moment. And the reason I say that is because the government's disclosures about their witnesses — understandably this happens in the course of preparing for trial — have somewhat evolved from the time they made their initial disclosures and the defense expert was intended to be a rebuttal expert, as I understood it, but, you know, to some extent is rebutting a moving target. So now that it's I think relatively clear and fixed what the government's case is, to the extent that the defense wants to supplement its disclosure to offer new rebuttal opinions to address things that we heard in the government's papers, responsive papers on the motions in

limine or in the argument, you can do that. But I'd ask that you do it in the next, let's say, two weeks, just so it doesn't get too stale.

And then in addition, I had understood that the defense had intended to make disclosures of the sort that Mr. Monteleoni was asking for but perhaps not on the timetable, since the trial has been pushed out, that necessarily makes sense anymore.

So let me hear from Mr. LaVerne. When would you be prepared to make additional disclosures about the details of your expert's testimony that have already been disclosed?

MR. SCHOEMAN: With respect to Mr. LaVerne, this is Mr. Schoeman, and I think the division of labor here puts this one on my court. And --

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Schoeman.

MR. SCHOEMAN: Judge, we'd be happy to do as the Court is directing and within two weeks will, if we have a revised notice in response to what's transpired, and we'll at that time also provide the details of the calculations, most of which is just arithmetic on that particular issue, but we can provide something in two weeks.

THE COURT: Okay. I mean, it matters what it is you're adding and subtracting, so I'm sure the government would appreciate that.

All right. Let's talk about the trial date. And I'm

not even sure how to do this, because of course at the moment jury trials in the Southern District of New York are at a standstill, and then once they revive, we will have to make an application, and although we will be near the front of the line, all the people who are incarcerated and waiting for trial will be before us. So what I'm suggesting is that we just pick a date in the second quarter. I'll apply for it, and we'll hope for the best. And I don't think we can do more. The other option is just to say the heck with the second quarter, maybe everybody's healthy by the third quarter, we just pick a date and do it, but, you know, of course I don't know that either.

So any thoughts from anyone?

MR. SCHOEMAN: Sure. I'll go first. This is Mr. Schoeman again.

So we appreciate the situation we all find ourselves in, and we wish we had the same crystal ball. And just to be clear, having done the trial a couple of times, obviously Mr. Calk continues to want a trial at the soonest opportunity but also very much feels strongly that the trial that occurs should include live witnesses as opposed to video witnesses. And just to be clear with the Court, and I've been clear with the government, we would prefer a trial -- we would object to a trial, a sooner trial that had video witnesses and would prefer a slightly later trial that had live witnesses. But we agree

with the Court that how to get there in the current environment is difficult and it would require seeing into the future. So we have no problem and would appreciate being put in for a trial date in the second quarter, but we do want just to be clear with the Court, that should the issue present itself again where we would be potentially put to the question of, would you prefer a trial sooner with video witnesses or slightly later with live witnesses, our very strong preference, based on what we perceive to be significant prejudice to the defendant, would be to have live witnesses.

THE COURT: Okay. So --

MR. MONTELEONI: And we don't --

THE COURT: Go ahead. Mr. Monteleoni?

MR. MONTELEONI: Sorry. This is Paul Monteleoni for the government.

We don't object to proceeding in that fashion. I guess we would just note that the second quarter includes some dates that are pretty soon and then some dates that are less soon, and I think in the interest of avoiding sort of serial adjournments where we're all sort of gearing up for a trial in short periods of time, I think we would want the date to be towards the back of the second quarter, maybe, you know, I'd say, certainly no less than 90 days from now. But other than that, we have no objection.

THE COURT: Okay. What about end of June?

1 MR. MONTELEONI: That's fine for the government. 2 THE COURT: Okay. And Mr. Schoeman? 3 MR. SCHOEMAN: Yes. So I think that that's fine for 4 the defense. Because we're all in different places, I'm going 5 to give a few seconds for people to let me know electronically 6 if middle or end of June is a problem, but assuming -- or they 7 could speak up on the phone. But I think a date in middle of June or so would be fine. 8 9 MR. LaVERNE: This is Darren LaVerne. I think we're 10 all good on the June date. 11 MR. MARGOLIS: Jeremy Margolis. We're good in June. 12 THE COURT: Okay. Anyone else want to chime in? 13 So let's set it for June 28th, on the theory that 14 maybe we will have a very good chance by then of actually going 15 forward and not have to sort of prepare and shut down again. And I'll issue a brief order that summarizes my 16 17 rulings on the experts and also a trial scheduling order, and 18 we'll go from there. 19 Is there anything else we should talk about? 20 MR. MONTELEONI: We would request that time be 21 excluded in the interest of justice and due to the complexity 22 of the case, as the last exclusion was done. 23 Okay. Any objection to that? THE COURT: 24 MR. SCHOEMAN: We would consent to the exclusion of 25 time based on the conditions of the COVID pandemic.

THE COURT: Okay. So what I'll do is I will include in my written order from our conference today a formal exclusion of time between now and the new trial date, which is June 28th, based on the current conditions, meaning the pandemic.

All right. I take it there's nothing else. I think this was productive. Thank you very much. And I'll hear from you all soon.

Thank you. We're adjourned.

ALL COUNSEL: Thank you, your Honor.